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2.1  Introduction 
Robert Giffen, of paradox fame, thought estimates  of aggregate wealth have 
eight uses; the following have immediate relevance: 
1. To  measure the accumulation of  capital in  communities at intervals of 
some length . . . 
2.  To  compare the income of  a community, where estimates of income exist, 
with its property . . . 
4. To  measure, in conjunction with other factors, such as aggregate income, 
revenue, and population, the relative strength and resources of  different 
communities. 
5.  To  indicate generally the proportions of the different descriptions of prop- 
erty in  a country to the total-how  the wealth of  a community is com- 
posed. 
6. To  measure the progress of a community from period to period, or the 
relative progress of  two or more communities, in  conjunction with the 
facts as to progress in income, population, and the like; to apply, in fact, 
historically and in conjunction with No.  1, the measures used under the 
above heads 2, 3, 4  and 5 for a comparison at a given moment. (1889, 
136-37) 
Robert E. Gallman is Kenan Professor of Economics and History at the University of  North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, and research associate of  the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The research underlying this paper was funded by the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
during my tenure as an Olin Fellow, and by the National Science Foundation, to which organiza- 
tions I express my gratitude. In another form the paper was given to seminars at the California 
Institute of Technology, the University of Chicago, the University of California at Davis and Los 
Angeles,  and Northwestern  University. At  all of these seminars I received useful suggestions, 
especially from Lance Davis, David Galenson, Morgan Kousser, Kenneth Sokoloff, and Soko- 
loffs graduate class in economic history. The discussant of the paper, Stanley Engerman, was, as 
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Simon Kuznets, who made use of the list, said that the distributions alluded 
to in item 5 should include the size distribution of wealth (Giffen 1889; Kuz- 
nets 1958; see Engerman and Gallman 1983 for more on these issues). 
The remarks of Giffen and Kuznets provide a justification for this paper, a 
list of things to include in it, and a set of suggestions as to how it should be 
related to the other papers prepared for this conference. Particularly attractive 
is Giffen’s notion that many different types of  aggregate series, as well as 
compositional indexes,  should  figure in  the  measurement of  growth. He 
would have felt comfortable at the conference at which this paper was given, 
as the participants approached the questions of  economic development and 
standards of living from various directions, using data on labor force, income, 
wealth, consumption, wages and prices, productivity, and heights. 
Kuznets believed that a perfectly realized index of development would trace 
out shifts in human material welfare. Such an index could be employed to 
measure changes in  the standard of  living-so  long as we  understand that 
term to refer to the material aspects of  life-without  the need to introduce 
other measurements. But Kuznets was well aware that the indexes of  devel- 
opment with which scholars must work are far from ideal and that, therefore, 
a variety of them may be required. In the spirit of Giffen and Kuznets, then, 
this paper treats the capital stock series as one that bears on the standard of 
living, rather than as one that measures it.’ 
Capital stock series have two possible conceptual relationships to economic 
growth (Gallman 1986). First,  such a series may  be used to measure the 
wealth accumulated by a society. The accumulation will be influenced by the 
economic performance of the economy in the past, by the degree of frugality 
displayed by its people individually, by the success the society had in its mil- 
itary activities, and by communal saving and investment decisions. The mea- 
sure is clearly different from income, in that it relates to a stock collected over 
a period of  years, not a flow during one year. Income and capital series are 
likely to change at different rates, then, at least in the short run. But the two 
types of series do both bear on the material well-being of  the people of the 
society.2  In the very long run they are also likely to exhibit roughly the same 
1. This is not the first attempt to study the American economy before the Civil War by examin- 
ing capital stock data. See, for example, Jones (1980);  Goldsmith (1952, 1985); Davis, Easterlin, 
Parker et al. (1972). I think, however, that it is the most serious effort to assure that the various 
estimates are consistent from one date to the next. 
2. One virtue of a capital stock series as an indicator of  growth is that the short-term movements 
of such a series are likely to be much less violent than, for example, the short-term movements of 
a true income  series.  If  estimates are available only at intermittent years,  the rates of growth 
computed from the former are much less likely to be influenced by transient phenomena than are 
the rates of growth of the latter. It should be said, however, that this distinction probably does not 
apply to the income estimates for the years before 1840 that were put together by Thomas Weiss 
for this volume, since his estimating procedure does not pick up the effects of short-term influ- 
ences on income, nor is it intended to. Weiss’s estimates come close to describing the output 
capacity of the economy, rather than actual output. 81  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
growth rates, so that a capital series can serve in some instances as a proxy for 
income. 
The second approach is to view capital in its capacity as an input into the 
production process. Whereas the first approach looks chiefly to the past and 
sees capital as the accumulation created by  society, the second looks to the 
present and the future. It sees the capital stock as one factor influencing cur- 
rent production, as well as production to be expected of the economy in fu- 
ture. Clearly, such a series is particularly useful when combined with esti- 
mates of the other inputs. 
If the direct relationship between real capital and material well-being is to 
be examined, the capital stock series should be deflated by a consumers’ price 
index. That is, the stock should be appraised in terms of  its equivalent in 
consumer goods. If, on the other hand, one is concerned with productive po- 
tential, proper deflation is in terms of the prices of  the components of the 
capital stock. Both forms of deflation are employed in this paper. That is, the 
capital stock is treated as an index of both the material well-being of the soci- 
ety and its productive power. 
The concept of  capital is elastic. Some analysts have included land and 
investment in humans as elements of the stock. For most purposes, it is best 
to treat land as land and human capital as a characteristic of  labor. In the 
present instance, the second preference makes a virtue of  a necessity: there 
are no comprehensive estimates of human capital covering the full period of 
interest here. This paper introduces a set of estimates of the land stock, but 
they are not treated as part of the supply of capital.3 
Although land is not included in the capital stock series of this paper, im- 
provements to land are. In this respect the series is unconventional. Most cap- 
ital estimates include structures but omit other important improvements, such 
as the clearing and first breaking of land. In this paper a conventional series is 
presented and is linked with estimates extending well into the twentieth cen- 
tury,  for comparative purposes. But the series that is subjected to the most 
intense examination is one that includes the value of land clearing and break- 
ing. These activities took up a substantial part of the work time of agricultural 
workers and made an immensely important contribution to the capital stock 
before the Civil War. They cannot properly be ignored. 
3. Should the value of slaves be counted as part of the value of the capital stock? If we are 
interested, say, in the savings and investment behavior of planters, then the answer is surely yes. 
This paper is not concerned with that topic. It is concerned with the measurement of long-term 
economic growth. Slaves are regarded as part of the labor force. They are also treated as part of 
population, for purposes of computing per capita levels of the capital stock. 
While I will present no estimates of the value of human capital, the general pattern of change in 
this variable across the period under review here is quite clear. Both the fraction of the population 
of children attending school and the length of the school year increased as time passed, as did the 
fraction of the work force holding semiskilled and skilled jobs. The rate of increase of human 
capital is therefore almost certain to have risen as time passed. See Fishlow (1966a,  1966b) and 
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The value of consumer durables is also sometimes incorporated in capital 
stock estimates, but appears in only one table in this paper, because appro- 
priate figures are only intermittently available. The loss is not great. The value 
of consumer durables was small, compared with the rest of the capital stock, 
through most of the period considered in this paper, and the rate of change of 
the capital stock is approximately the same, regardless of whether or not du- 
rables are treated as capital (see table 2.2). 
The United States (for convenience, the term will be applied to the colonies 
of  1774) began life as a debtor nation and gradually shifted to the position of 
a creditor nation. Ignoring recent experience, the national capital stock- 
which measures the net capital holdings of  Americans-grew  very  much 
more rapidly over time than did the domestic capital stock, defined as capital 
physically located in the United States, regardless of who owned it. Through 
the rest of  the paper, both series will be examined, although most attention 
will be devoted to the domestic capital stock. 
The title refers to the period before the Civil War, but the series introduced 
will typically cover a much longer stretch of time. The fundamental questions 
at issue have to do with persistent changes, and these questions can be prop- 
erly addressed only if data bearing on long periods are available. Some rates 
Table 2.1  Capital and Wealth, 1774 and 1805, Estimates of Jones, Goldsmith, 
and Gallman (millions of current dollars) 
1774  1805 
Jones  Gallman  Goldsmith  Gallman 
All structures 
All land improvements 
All privately owned real 
estate 
Shipping 
Other producers’ durables 
Inventories 
Animals 
Total domestic capital 
International claims 
Total national capital 
Total domestic capital, 
including the value of 
clearing and first 
breaking of  farmland 
Total private domestic 
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20  39 

















-  57 
936 
Sources: Jones  (1980, 90,  converted to dollars by  means of  the exchange rate on page  10); 
Gallman, see text; Goldsmith (1952, 315). 
aIncludes  household equipment. 83  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
of growth covering relatively short intervals-such  as the two decades 1840- 
60,  which have been the focus of much scholarly interest-will  be exhibited, 
but the reader should bear in mind that such rates are influenced by short-term 
phenomena. They cannot be used as the exclusive means of identifying shifts 
in trend rates of growth. 
Section 2.2  deals briefly with the nature of the data underlying the estimates 
and the broad rules guiding the estimating procedure. Section 2.3 treats the 
rates of growth of the real capital stock and the real capital stock per capita, 
with the purpose of putting growth before the Civil War  into historical per- 
spective. Giffen’s suggestion that the rates of change of capital and income be 
compared is taken up. 
Economic development involves structural shifts as well as growth in the 
aggregates. Section 2.4 treats the changing composition of the capital stock 
and shows its connection to the nature of American economic development. 
Section 2.5 brings together estimates of all three factor inputs and combines 
them into several series describing the growth of total factor inputs. Estimates 
of changes in total factor productivity are presented. Section 2.6 is a summary 
of conclusions. 
The data on which the estimates rest pose many  problems. Appendix A 
takes up several important features of the series and considers a few tests of 
the most affected components. 
2.2  The Estimating Procedures 
Estimates were made for the years  1774, 1799, 1805, 1815, and  1840- 
1900 (at decade intervals) and for various dates in the twentieth century. As 
Giffen points out, capital series can be used to study economic growth, “re- 
gard being always had to the fact that the data and methods employed are 
sufficiently alike for the special purpose in hand” (1889, 136). The object of 
this section is to consider whether “the data and methods employed are suffi- 
ciently alike for the special purpose at hand.” The subject is treated further in 
appendix A. 
The current price capital stock estimates for  1850 and  1860  are based 
chiefly on census materials, which have been tested in a variety of ways and 
adjusted to make them consistent from one date to the next and to make them 
conform to an appropriate concept. The best overall tests that have been con- 
ducted so far are checks against perpetual inventory estimates derived from 
measurements of investment flows. The results of  the checks are excellent 
(Gallman 1986, 1987). 
The 1840 figures were similarly derived from census data, augmented in 
various ways, chiefly by contemporary estimates produced by Ezra Seaman. 
The census in  1840 was quite different from the ones that followed. It was 
administered under a different law and asked different questions. For  some 
purposes it is quite good, but it is clearly weaker than the later censuses as a 84  Robert E. Gallman 
source of material for the estimation of the capital stock, although it has sur- 
vived testing quite well. 
The estimates for these three years and some of the tests that have been run 
are described in Gallman (1986, 1987). These sources also contain the esti- 
mates for the years 1870-1900, which will be used in the present paper to put 
the experience of the years 1774-1860 in context. Tests of the post-Civil War 
data by means of perpetual inventory estimates suggest that the 1870, 1880, 
and 1890 aggregate capital stock figures are unlikely to be perfectly consist- 
ent. It appears probable that the 1880 figure is too low. Calculations of  the 
rates of  change of  the capital stock from this series are therefore likely to 
understate the true rate of growth for the period 1870 to 1880 and overstate it 
in the years  1880 to  1890, matters of  no great importance for present pur- 
poses. 
The twentieth-century figures were assembled by  splicing the nineteenth- 
century estimates to Raymond Goldsmith’s series, which are based on perpet- 
ual inventory procedures (Goldsmith 1982). As indicated above, census-style 
and perpetual inventory estimates appear to be roughly comparable. 
The estimates for the years before  1840 come from a variety of  sources 
quite different from the censuses, which increases the risk that the capital 
stock estimates based on them may not be consistent, one with the other, and 
all with the figures for the years 1840 onward. The data that are farthest re- 
moved in type from census data are the ones underlying the capital stock fig- 
ure for 1774. These data were taken chiefly from Alice Jones’s (1980) work 
with probate records. The figures for 1799, 1805, and  1815 rest principally 
on sources that are more likely to be consistent with census records: the direct 
taxes of 1799, 1813, and 1815. (I used the data in Blodget [1806] 1964, Pitkin 
1835, and Soltow 1984.) The 1805 estimate is based on the work of Samuel 
Blodget  ([  18061  1964)  and  Raymond  Goldsmith’s  (1952)  adjustments 
of Blodget’s work. The principal underlying source is the direct tax of  1799. 
Blodget apparently carried the 1799 data forward to 1805 at a rate of growth 
he believed most probable. The 1805 estimate falls out of line with those of 
1799 and 1815 and is probably too high. The history of the period leads one 
to expect a higher rate of growth between 1799 and 1805 than between 1805 
and  1815, of  course, but not quite so high as the Blodget data suggest. Of 
course it is possible that the 1805 figure is close to the truth and that the other 
two are too low, but I do not think that is the case. It is also possible that the 
bias was introduced by my adjustment of the Blodget data (see table 2. l), but 
I doubt that is so. 
The 1774 through 1815 estimates depend on the sources listed above, aug- 
mented and adjusted so that the same concept of capital underlies each final 
aggregate figure, and so that the same estimating principles are applied in each 
case. The last point is an important one. While accurate estimates were sought 
in each instance, it seemed clear that it would be better to have a series for 85  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
which the general level might  be  wrong, but  which describes the rate of 
growth in a reasonably accurate way, than to have one for which the individual 
estimates might be closer to the truth, but which gives a more strongly biased 
account of the rate of growth. The choice made was always for consistency 
rather than for perfect acc~racy.~ 
Table 2.1 compares some of  the details of  the new estimates with those 
provided by Jones and Goldsmith. As will be evident, the adjustments made 
to the Jones figures were relatively unimportant, so that the new estimates tell 
very much the same story as do the data taken from Jones. The differences 
between my  estimates and Goldsmith’s are greater, and are particularly pro- 
nounced with respect to inventories of  all kinds. Goldsmith’s estimates seem 
too low  to me; for example, imports in  1805 ran around $150 million, and 
imports represented a relatively small part of total economic activity, even in 
1805. Even a very modest estimate of the fraction of imports held, on average, 
in inventory across the year would leave very little for inventories of domestic 
goods, were we  to accept Goldsmith’s figure for total inventories. But the 
question of  the appropriate level of  inventories in  1805  is perhaps not the 
important issue. The important point is the one made in the previous para- 
graph. In building the inventory estimates for all of the years, 1774-1900,  I 
have tried to follow consistent methods and have paid more attention to con- 
sistency than to the specific level of  any one estimate. Consistency permits 
appropriate comparisons to be made across time, an important desideratum. 
Users of  capital stock series for the nineteenth century, then, would be well 
advised to use either Goldsmith’s estimates or mine, but not some combina- 
tion of the two. 
All of the capital figures are expressed in market prices or in net reproduc- 
4. For example, imagine a series that has true values of  100 and 200 in two widely separated 
years. If the estimates  produced for these years are each too large by  10 percent, then the estimated 
series and the true series will describe the same rate of  growth. That would not be the case if the 
estimates were closer to the truth in each year, but deviated from it by different percentages-say 
the first estimate amounted to 95 and the second to 210. Obviously, one cannot know with cer- 
tainty that the first circumstance or the second holds in any given instance. But there are cases in 
which one has the choice of following a consistent procedure and using consistent data from one 
date to the next, in full knowledge that the results are unlikely to be exactly correct, or employing 
different methods and bodies of data, in an effort to come as close as possible in each year to the 
true value. Where I was presented with these options, I chose consistency. (Emerson, after all, 
only deplored a foolish consistency.) But consistency at the component level does not guarantee 
unbiased rates of growth at the aggregate level. Suppose that the level of each component series is 
biased by a given percentage in each year, but the given percentage varies from one component to 
the next, by amount, sign, or both. For example, suppose that the figures composing the slow- 
growing components are biased in an upward direction, while the figures representing the fast- 
growing components are biased in  a downward direction. The rate of  growth of  the aggregate 
composed of  these elements will be biased in a downward direction. All that can be done in this 
case is to attempt to judge and to describe the direction and probable importance  of the bias in the 
rate of  growth. 
The details of  the construction of the capital stock estimates for the years 1774-1815  will be 
provided in a monograph currently under way. 86  Robert E. Gallman 
tion costs. The two are virtually identical, where it has been possible to run a 
test. They are net of retirements and of capital consumption, with one excep- 
tion, to be discussed further below. 
The cost-of-living deflator is the one assembled by  Paul David and Peter 
Solar (1977), the only series that covers the full period. According to Claudia 
Goldin and Robert Margo (1989), the index rises too little or falls too much 
in the nineteenth century before the mid-1840s. If they are correct, the rate of 
growth of  the capital stock deflated by this series is too high in the period 
before the mid-l840s, a point to which we will return. Dorothy Brady’s in- 
vestment goods price indexes from volume 30  of  Studies  in Income  and 
Wealth (1966), extended to the years before 1840 in a variety of ways, were 
the chief bases for the deflation of the capital stock, viewed as an input. The 
Brady index numbers refer to census years. They had to be adjusted modestly 
to make them relevant to the dates to which the capital stock estimates refer 
(the last day of the census year). Conceptually, these index numbers are ex- 
actly what are required. They were augmented in various ways to permit the 
deflation of inventories and certain types of  farm improvements, for which 
Brady supplied no indexes. The problems of assembling appropriate deflators 
for the years before 1840  require a paper of their own. They are treated further 
in appendix A. 
2.3  Rates of Growth in Historical Perspective 
The concern of this paper is with American economic growth before the 
Civil War,  which means that the measures of central concern to it are real 
measures, particularly real measures deflated by population. The current price 
estimates are worth at least a brief inspection, however. On the whole, they 
are less processed than the real figures and may  therefore be  a little more 
reliable. Table 2.2 contains current price estimates of the capital stock, con- 
ventionally defined.s Three points come through very clearly. The rates of 
growth are  all very  high; the capital stock in  1980 was  apparently about 
40,000 times as large as the stock of  1774, an extraordinary figure. Although 
most of  the rates were computed over considerable stretches of time, and 
therefore should not be unduly influenced by transient phenomena, they vary 
quite widely from one period to another. Finally, it is clear that the experience 
before the Civil War  was by  no means uniform. In particular, the rates of 
growth are especially low  in  the years between the turn of the century and 
1840, and especially high from 1840 to 1860. The second period is short, and 
5.  The conventional concepts are the domestic capital stock and the national capital stock. The 
former includes the value of structures, equipment, and inventories  physically located in the coun- 
try at issue; the latter includes all of  these items, but also adjusts for net international claims, so 
that the measure includes the value of capital owned by nationals of the country at issue. Uncon- 
ventional estimates may include, additionally, the value of the clearing and first breaking of land, 
the value of  human capital, the value of consumer durahles, etc. 87  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
Table 2.2  indexes and Average Annual Rates of Change of the U.S. Capital 
Stock, Current Prices, 1774-1980 
Domestic  Domestic Capital &  National 
Capital  Consumer Durables  Capital 






























































































Sources: See text. 
the rates of growth computed across it could be influenced by business cycles 
or long swings. But Abramovitz’s (1989) chronology of long swings and pro- 
tracted depressions suggests that this is probably not a problem. 
The record described by table 2.2 is influenced both by real phenomena and 
price level changes. The price index numbers in table 2.3 allow one to judge 
how  important the latter developments were.  Between  1774 and  1900 the 
long-term trend of  the two price indexes appears to be close to zero, but in the 
short term prices were quite unstable. In the twentieth century there is addi- 
tionally a pronounced upward trend. Notice, finally, that while the two in- 
dexes tend to move together, the consumer index is the more volatile. The 
plan to deflate by two separate price indexes, then, seems to have substantive, 
as well as theoretical, merit. 88  Robert E. Gallman 
Table 2.3  Capital Stock Deflators, Base 1860,1774-1900 
Domestic Capital  Consumer 












































Sources: See text. 
The deflated series appear in table 2.4. Four matters of  interest strike one 
immediately: First, deflation does reduce the volatility of the series somewhat; 
part of the short-term movement observed in table 2.2 is due to price fluctua- 
tions. Second, it is clear that the real capital stock has grown more slowly in 
the present century than it had previously. Third, it is also clear that the rate 
of growth accelerated between the years before 1840 and the years thereafter. 
The broad pattern, then, is of an early acceleration, followed by a subsequent 
retardation. Finally, notice that these findings emerge from all four series, the 
national and domestic capital stocks, deflated by the consumer price index and 
by the capital price index. But the detailed pattern of change differs from one 
series to the other. For example, compare the results obtained for the period 
1929-53.  The real capital stock, viewed as accumulated consuming power, 
grew much faster than did the real capital stock, viewed as an input to produc- 
tion: the prices of  capital goods increased faster than consumer prices, be- 
tween these two dates. 
More interesting for present purposes is the pattern across the years 1774- 
1840. Notice (table 2.3) that consumer prices advanced much farther than 
capital goods prices between 1774 and the turn of the century, and fell much 
farther between then and  1840. Across the full span,  1774-1840,  the two 
index numbers show roughly similar changes, so that the two capital stock 
series yield about the same results. But the interpretation of  the subperiods 
before 1840 depends entirely on the system of deflation one chooses to use. 
And the systems of deflation, recall, view the capital stock in two quite differ- 
ent ways: as the value of the accumulations of the years, expressed in con- 
sumer goods, as against the productive power of the capital stock. 89  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
Table 2.4  Indexes and Average Annual Rates of Change of the U.S. Capital 
Stock, 1860 Prices, 1774-1980 
Domestic Capital Deflator  National Capital Deflator 
Capital  Consumer  Capital  Consumer 
Price Index  Price Index  Price Index  Price Index 
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Sources: See text. 
No doubt the contrast is in some measure spurious, however. Items of con- 
struction compose an important part of the capital stock throughout (see table 
2.8). The deflators for this component in the years before  1840 were con- 
structed in part from data on wage rates. Wage rates tend to be less volatile 
than prices (see Robert A. Margo’s paper in this volume). The capital stock 
price index numbers for the period before 1840 may therefore understate the 
fluctuations experienced by the prices of capital goods. It is thus possible that 
the measured rate of growth of the real capital stock, viewed as an input, is 
too high across the years 1774-99  and too low between 1799 and 1840. The 
matter is unlikely to be important with respect to the main point of  present 90  Robert E. Gallman 
concern, however. It seems clear that the rate of growth of the capital stock 
did accelerate between 1774-1840 and the subsequent years. 
The capital stock treated so far ignores a component of investment that was 
important, particularly in the years before 1840: the activities of land clearing 
and first breaking which engaged so large a part of the working lives of Amer- 
ican farmers (Primack 1962). Table 2.5 contains index numbers describing 
the change over time in the real value of the domestic capital stock, inclusive 
of the value of these farm-making activities. The overall rate of growth of this 
aggregate-3.9  percent,  1774-1900-is  very much  lower than the one re- 
corded for the less comprehensive capital stock treated in table 2.4-4.5  per- 
cent (capital stock deflator in each case). These findings reflect the fact, of 
course, that farm formation was a very important part of capital, but one that 
increased over time much more slowly than the other components of the stock, 
a point to which we will return. 
The acceleration picked out by the data of table 2.4 reappears in table 2.5 
and in a more marked form. But notice that the pattern is somewhat different. 
The series deflated by the prices of capital now shows a higher rate of growth 
across the period 1799-1840 than across the period 1774-1799, in contrast to 
the results shown by  table 2.4.  The explanation is that introduction of  the 
farm-making elements of the capital stock necessarily altered the capital price 
index numbers. Farm making was carried out by farm laborers, and the value 
of farm making is the value of the time of farm workers. Farm wage rates thus 
figure in the estimation of the value of land clearing and breaking, as well as 
in the deflation of these components of the stock. Farm wage rates rose quite 
pronouncedly between 1774 and  1840, which gives the deflator an upward 
tilt. 
All of  the series discussed above refer to the aggregate capital stock. A 
more interesting variable, however, is the per capita capital stock. Estimates 
appear in table 2.6. Deflating by population produces two important, if easily 
anticipated, results. First, the retardation of  growth in the twentieth century 
disappears, while the acceleration between  1774-1 840 and  1840-1900  be- 
comes very much more pronounced. The acceleration appears in every variant 
but is particularly evident in  the series describing the most comprehensive 
measure, deflated by capital stock prices. 
The acceleration in the rate of growth of the capital stock reflects in part the 
increase in the investment rate and the rise in the capital/output ratio, which 
seems to have begun as early as the turn of the century, at least in the case of 
the conventional measurements, but which was particularly pronounced from 
1840 until 1900 (Davis and Gallman 1978; table 2.7). That does not appear to 
be the only source, however. The rates of growth of real national product per 
capita from 1840 onward were higher than the rates of growth of real capital 
per capita in the period before 1840, regardless of the capital concept adopted 
and the deflator employed (Davis and Gallman 1978; Gallman 1966). Accept- 
ing the rate of change of the capital stock series before 1840 as an upper- 91  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
Table 2.5  Indexes and Average Annual Rates of Change of the U.S. Domestic 
Capital Stock,  Including the Value of Clearing and Breaking 
Farmland,  1860 Prices, 1774-1900 
Deflator 
Capital  Consumer 
Price Index  Price Index 


































Panel B: Average Annual Rates of Change (8) 
1774-1840  3.4  3.9 
1774-99  3.3  3.1 
1799-1 840  3.5  4.0 
1840-1900  4.4  4.5 
1840-60  5.0  6.1 
1860-1900  4.0  3.7 
Sources: See text. 
bound estimate of the rate of  change of  real national product, the evidence 
suggests quite clearly that the rate of growth of real national product per capita 
accelerated in the years before the Civil War. 
These results are generally consistent with Thomas Weiss’s inferences con- 
cerning income, which he derived from his labor force series (see table 2.7 
and Weiss’s paper in this volume). Both Weiss’s figures and the capital stock 
data were assembled from fragmentary evidence and are subject to substantial 
margins for error. But both series seem to tell about the same story, and that 
affords greater confidence that the story is a true one.6 
6. The capital and income (Weiss) data permit a check on an inference advanced by Davis and 
Gallman, who guessed that the net investment rate averaged between 6.2% and 7.0% in the period 
1805-40  (Davis and Gallman 1978,2). The rates of  growth and capital/output ratios in or under- 
lying table 2.7 are consistent with net investment rates, computed against GDP,  of  between  5 
percent and 6.5 percent. The Davis and Gallman figures were computed against NNP, however. If 
the data in and underlying table 2.7 are adjusted to make them conform more nearly to the con- 
cepts Davis and Gallman were employing, the implied investment rates become roughly 5.9 per- 
cent and 7.2 percent, reasonably close to the Davis-Gallman  figures. 92  Robert E. Gallman 
Table 2.6  Indexes and Average Annual Rates of Change of the U.S. Domestic 
Capital Stock and Structures, Per Capita, Conventional and 
Unconventional Concepts, 1860 Prices, 1774-1980 
Conventional Concept,  Including Clearing & Breaking, 
Deflated by  Deflated by 
Capital  Consumer  Capital  Consumer 
Price Index  Price Index  Price Index  Price Index 
































































Panel B:  Average Annual Rates of  Change (%) 
1774-  1  840 
1774-99 






















1.1  0.4  0.8 
0.7  0.1  0.4 
1.3  0.5  1  .o 
2.3  1.8  1.9 
3.3  1.9  2.9 




Sources: See text 
2.4  Changing Composition of Capital Stock 
Rates of change say something about the process of growth and develop- 
ment; data on the structure of the economy tell more. Development consists 
of  structural change. 
The conventional measure of  domestic capital, in current prices, exhibits 
two pronounced compositional shifts: the fraction of  the capital stock ac- 
counted for by  animals drops very far, indeed, while the share attributable to 93  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
Table 2.7  Real GDP and Real Domestic Capital per Capita, Conventional and 
Unconventional Concepts, 1840 Prices, 1800-1860 
1800  1840 
Real GDP  per capita ($) 
Conventional, variant A 
Conventional, variant B 




Real domestic capital per capita ($) 
Conventional  104 
Unconventional  175 
Conventional, variant A  1.42 
Conventional, variant B  1.57 



















Sources: The real GDP per  capita estimates  are from Weiss’s  paper  in  this volume.  For  the 
remaining estimates, see the text. 
structures rises, both of these developments occurring chiefly after 1815 (see 
table 2.8). But current price data are not so useful, in this context, as constant 
price data, which tell a very interesting story. They show that the structure of 
the capital stock changed very  little, down to  1840. Thereafter, there were 
accelerating shifts. The share of animals in the total dropped precipitately and 
inventories dropped mildly, while the share of structures rose a little and the 
share of equipment rose very much. There is the strong suggestion of an econ- 
omy  shifting in  the  direction of  industrial activity and  modern  economic 
growth: away from agriculture and animal power, and toward manufacturing 
and mechanical power. There is no question that stirrings can be identified 
well before 1840-Kenneth  Sokoloffs work shows clearly that important in- 
dustrial change can be dated to  1820, at least. (See Sokoloffs paper in this 
volume.) But these activities could not have carried a very heavy weight in 
the economy much before 1840, and that is probably what the data in table 
2.8 are showing us.  Bias in the estimates may overstate the decline in the 
relative importance of animals after 1870, and may contribute to the finding 
of  stability in the share of  structures in the capital stock before  1840 (see 
appendix A), but these matters are probably not of much importance. 
The introduction of the value of farm making into the capital stock produces 
some expected shifts. Concentrating on the constant price data, the value of 
land clearing and breaking accounted for over half of  the capital stock in 1774 
and something under half in  1799. This figure dropped modestly to  1840- 
when it was a little less than a third-and  more dramatically thereafter, re- 
flecting the relative decline of the agricultural sector. In this variant, invento- 
ries retained roughly the same share of the capital stock after 1799, while the 
share of  structures experienced a strong upward movement from the same 
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lsble 2.8  Constituents of the Domestic Capital Stock, Expressed as Shares in the 
Domestic Capital Stock, 1774-1900 
1774  1799  1805  1815  1840  1850  1860  1870  1880  1890  1900 
~~~  ~ 

















.33  .35 
.I4  .I5 
.35  .34 
.I8  .I6 
.34  .40 
.09  .09 
.35  .32 
.23  .I9 
Current Prices 
.41  .45  .47  .54  .54  .55  .61  .60 
.I3  .I4  .I3  .I2  .I1  .lI  .I3  .I4 
.26  .24  .26  .22  .24  .24  .I9  .I9 
.21  .I7  .I3  .I2  .I1  .09  .08  .07 
Constant (1860)  Prices 
.41  .43  .46  .54  .55  .50  .49  .46 
.07  .08  .09  .I2  .I3  .I6  .25  .30 
.29  .26  .27  .22  .22  .25  .21  .I9 
.22  .23  .I7  .I2  .I0  .09  .06  .04 















.24  .21  .26 
.08  .09  .I1 
.I4  .23  .24 
.I5  .I1  .I2 
.40  .36  .28 
.I7  .I9  .25 
.04  .05  .05 
.I2  .20  .20 
.I1  .I3  .I2 
.56  .44  .39 
Current Prices 
.33  .33  .35 
.10  .I0  .I0 
.21  .I8  .20 
.I7  .I2  .I0 
.19  .28  .25 
Constant (I  860)  Prices 
.27  .29  .33 
.05  .06  .07 
.I9  .I7  .I9 
.14  .I5  .I2 
.36  .32  .28 
.42  .44  .47  .55  .55 
.09  .09  .I0  .I1  .I3 
.I7  .20  .21  .I7  .I8 
.09  .09  .08  .07  .06 
.22  .I7  .I4  .I0  .08 
.42  .44  .41  .44  .42 
.09  .I1  .I3  .22  .28 
.I7  .I8  .21  .I9  .I8 
.09  .08  .07  .05  .04 
.22  .I9  .I7  .I1  .08 
Sources: See text. 
aExcluding  animals. 
Table 2.9 is another way of considering the same phenomena.  It shows 
indexes of the per capita  supply of each of  the components of  the capital 
stock.  The growing  importance  of  structures  and, particularly,  equipment 
comes through powerfully, while the value of the stock of land clearing and 
first breaking is shown to have fallen well behind the growth of population. 
There were two elements involved in the production of this result. First, the 
volume of farmland per capita declined over time, as the population became 
less and less rural and farm-centered. Since American agriculture was able to 
feed a growing population  and expand its overseas sales, the decline in the 
value of farm improvements per capita went hand in hand with the growing 95  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
Table 2.9  Indexes of Per Capita Real Magnitudes, 1860 Prices, 1774-1900 
1774  1799  1805  1815  1840  1850  1860  1870  1880  1890  1900 
Structures  100  112  156  150  211  263  438  449  503  793  886 
Equipment  100  142  166  133  202  262  479  538  785  1,981  2,867 
Inventories’  100  166  176  149  178  218  253  258  360  479  526 
Animals  100  122  121  130  179  154  154  126  139  148  132 
hdclear-  100  81  74  64  73  70  72  62  66  60  55 
ing & 
breaking 
Sources: See text. 
‘Excluding animals. 
productivity of agricultural land. Second, as population moved westward, out 
of the wooded areas, the cost of preparing land for cultivation fell. Toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, then, the real value of farm improvements (ex- 
clusive of structures) per acre was smaller than it had been in the eighteenth 
century. The meaning of this change is taken up further in appendix A. 
On the whole, the structural evidence supports the conclusions that one 
might tentatively draw from the aggregate series: the American economy be- 
gan to experience the process of modern economic growth in the years after 
the War of  18  12; by  the 1840s the modem components of  the economy were 
large enough and growing rapidly enough to have an observable impact on the 
rate of growth and the structure of the economy. 
2.5  The Growth of Total Factor Inputs 
The measurements of the capital stock, viewed as an input to the productive 
process, yield information that clearly bears on the speed and nature of Amer- 
ican economic growth. Measurements of  total factor inputs would be even 
more useful. The assembly of the additional required inputs is not very diffi- 
cult. Estimates of  the volume of agricultural land (the only land input that 
could be taken into account) already exist. (Gallman 1972, 201, 202, ex- 
tended to 1774 in the same manner as the extension to 1800.) Weiss has gen- 
erated new labor force figures for the years 1800-1900,  at ten-year intervals, 
and they were readily extended to 1774.’ 
7. The estimate is based on Jones (1980, 30) and Weiss’s chapter in this volume. According to 
Jones there were 53,056 indentured servants in 1774 and 480,932 slaves. All indentured servants 
were in the work force; following Weiss’s judgment for 1800, slaves ten and  older probably 
amounted to 65 percent of the population of  slaves, and nine-tenths of these people were in the 
work force. According to Jones, there were 396,158 free adult males, of  whom, if  we  follow 
Weiss’s treatment for the nineteenth century, 87.2 percent were in the work force. The rest of  the 
population-I  ,034,456-consisted  of  youths and children, by  Jones’s account. Assuming half 
were males (a safe guess) and that they were distributed among the age groups as the white popu- 
lation of  1800 was, then there were about 55,000 males, ten to fourteen years old, of whom 22.1 96  Robert E. Gallman 
Table 2.10, panel A, contains statements of  the rates of growth of  each 
input and each input per member of  the population for various periods be- 
tween 1774 and 1900. Notice that the labor force grew slightly more slowly 
than population between 1774 and 1800 and a little faster between 1800 and 
1840. Thereafter, with the expansion of  immigration, and  its effect on the 
structure of population, the labor force participation rate rose faster than be- 
fore. On the whole, the patterns of change of the other inputs are similar. The 
volume of agricultural land per capita actually declined throughout, but the 
rate of  decline was less after 1800 than before, while the quantity of capital 
increased faster than population, the rate rising persistently over time. The 
strong suggestion of these data is that the per capita supply of all inputs, taken 
together, must have grown very slowly, if at all, down to 1800, when it began 
to increase, the increase becoming more marked as time passed. 
This, in fact, is what is shown by  panel B of the table, which sets out the 
rates of  change of  all three factors combined. The rates of  growth of  total 
inputs and inputs per capita accelerated over time, the change in the per capita 
rates being particularly striking. 
There are three series describing rates of change of aggregate inputs. In the 
first, the underlying labor input is measured by the numbers of workers, with- 
out regard to the length of  the work year or the differential quality of  the 
workers. In the second and third, very crude efforts have been made to adjust 
the labor supply for sectoral differences in the work year, trends over time in 
the work year, and differences among sectors in the “quality” of workers. In 
series LFQV, the weights by which the rates of change of the three input series 
are combined (estimated factor income shares) vary from one year to the next; 
in series LFQF, the weights are fixed at the 1880 levels. The techniques em- 
ployed to make the estimates are described in appendix B; the adjustments are 
almost  certainly  too  large.  That  is,  the  rates  of  change  represented  by 
LFQV-and  possibly LFQF, as well-are  probably too large. The three sets 
of figures, however, may very well establish boundaries within which the rates 
of change of a properly adjusted labor input series would lie. 
In any case, the rates of change of  the combined input series do describe 
the same general pattern: an acceleration in the supply of  inputs and, espe- 
cially, inputs per capita. For the period following 1800, these findings once 
again parallel Weiss’s (table 2.7). Furthermore, there was not only an accel- 
eration in the rate of change of  aggregate inputs, but also in total factor pro- 
ductivity: the long-term rate of gain was substantially higher after 1840 than 
before (table 2.10, panel C). 
percent were in the work force (following Weiss’s judgment for 1800), and there were 53,815 who 
were fifteen to twenty years old, of whom (again following Weiss) 87.2 percent worked. Adding 
free females, ten years old and older (497,973, with a participation rate of 7.5  percent, per Weiss), 
brings the total labor force to 776,241. A check on the total: assuming an overall participation rate 
of 32.5 percent (typical of the early decades of the nineteenth century, according to Weiss) yields 
a figure of 765,039, close enough. 97  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
Table 2.10  Rates of Growth of Factor Supplies, Factor Supplies per Capita, and Total 
Factor Productivity, 1774-1900 
~  ~~ 
1774-1800  1800-1840  1840-1900  1840-60 
Panel A 
Labor force (LF)  3.09  3.09  2.72  3.41 
LFIpopulation  -0.08  0.11  0.20  0.31 
Land  2.26  2.80  2.17  2.87 
Land/population  -0.91  -0.18  -0.35  -0.23 
Capital (K)  3.39  3.45  4.40  5.17 
Upopulation  0.22  0.48  1.88  2.07 
Panel B 
Total factor inputs, LF  3.10  3.18  3.20  3.91 
Total factor inputs/population, LF  -0.07  0.20  0.68  0.81 
Total factor inputs, LFQF  3.25  3.47  3.57  4.41 
Total factors, inputs, LFQV  3.21  3.44  3.75  4.78 
Total factor inputs/population, LFQV  0.04  0.46  1.23  1.69 
Total factor inputs/population, LFQF  0.08  0.49  1.05  1.31 
Panel C 
Total Factor Productivity 
GDP, LF  .46  .82 
GNP, LF  .80  .70 
GDP, LFQF  .43  .20 
Sources: The real GDP estimates underlying the first set of total factor productivity estimates (panel C) 
are Weiss’s, chapter 1 in this volume (broad concept, variant C). They are expressed in 1840 prices, as 
are the capital stock estimates (domestic capital) used with them to estimate total factor productivity. 
The real GNP estimates (panel C)  were derived from those underlying Gallman (1966). They are 
expressed in  1860 prices and include the value of all land improvements made in the given year and the 
value of home manufactures. The capital stock estimates used in the analysis involving the GNP refer to 
the national capital stock. 
The labor input series is based on Weiss’s labor force figures. LF refers to this series in  unadjusted 
form. LFQV means that the labor force has been adjusted to take into account differences in work time 
and labor quality, both among sectors and over time (1840 onward); that is, the sectoral “weights” are 
variable. LFQF means that the labor force figures have been adjusted to take into account differences in 
time and quality among sectors, but not across time; that is, the sectoral “weights” are fixed. (In fact, 
the weights employed are those of  1880; only two sectors are distinguished in the fixed weight variant: 
“agriculture” and “all other.”) 
The rates of growth of  the capital stock, 1840-1900,  were computed from the series that incorporates 
the value of fencing. 
The weights assigned to the rates of growth of the individual factors of production are labor, .68; land, 
.03; and  capital, .29. These weights are intended to reflect income shares. (Land improvements, of 
course, are treated as capital.) 
GDP, LFQV  .25  -.17 
For estimating details, see the text, especially appendix B. 98  Robert E. Gallman 
These results are surely not amazing. The years from 1774 through 1815 
were years in which the young country engaged twice in major wars; when 
peace was achieved, American products were frequently prevented from en- 
tering their natural markets under reasonably free conditions. There was one 
period of booming trade, when the Napoleonic Wars created great opportuni- 
ties for American merchants, opportunities ended by  the Embargo of  1807 
and then the War of  1812. With the return of peace, the factory system began 
to spread in earnest, and by  1840 the production of textiles had been virtually 
completely transferred out of the home and the shop and into the factory. The 
variety of American manufacturing activities increased markedly in the 1840s 
and 1850s, and machine building began to assume the central position it was 
to occupy in American industrialization  for the rest of the century. The aggre- 
gate statistics are simply the embodiment of these well-known developments. 
The degree to which the benefits of  economic growth were offset by  costs 
unrecorded here and  the extent to which the benefits were shared among 
Americans are matters of considerable importance. But since they are taken 
up by John Wallis and me in the Introduction and by other authors contributing 
to this volume, it is reasonable to pass them by here. 
2.6  Conclusions 
The conclusions of this paper are readily summarized. The capital stock 
series suggest that the pace of American economic growth accelerated in the 
decades before the Civil War. The evidence for this statement is to be found in 
the real per capita capital stock figures, the various estimates of aggregate real 
inputs per capita, and the changing structure of  the capital stock, which de- 
scribe a process of industrialization. The components that make up the series 
have their weaknesses, but the review of these components conducted above, 
and also in appendix A, turned up no compelling reasons to believe that the 
computed rates of growth and structural changes are importantly biased. 
The acceleration of the rate of growth should not be allowed to obscure the 
progress  made  before  1840. The  series assembled in  this  paper  support 
Thomas Weiss’s finding that per capita GDP increased in the decades between 
1800 and  1840. Furthermore, the per capita supply of capital seems to have 
been increasing since 1774, and the supply of all factors of production, com- 
bined, seems to have increased at least as fast as population between the be- 
ginning of the Revolution and the turn of the century. There were bad times as 
well as good ones, and the standard of life surely sometimes declined, perhaps 
for extended periods. But the trend was mildly favorable between 1774 and 
179911800, if these series are to be believed, more clearly favorable from the 
turn of the century until 1840, and even more pronouncedly favorable there- 
after. The capital stock figures, however, bear only on the side of life that has 
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have brought a deterioration of the quality of life for some and may have for a 
time overwhelmed the capacity of  society to deal with problems of public 
health. Other indexes of  the standard of  life, stressing health, for example, 
may yield results at odds with those reported in this paper-certainly  this is 
the suggestion of the work described by Richard H. Steckel in his essay for 
this  volume. The  important point  to be  taken  from  the results  described 
herein, however, is that the performance of the economy, narrowly conceived, 
was improving, and at an accelerating pace. The means for dealing with the 
problems created by the reorganization of  society were therefore increasing. 
Solutions awaited the accumulation of the necessary knowledge and the emer- 
gence of a will to act. 
Appendix A 
Estimating Problems and Tests of Estimates 
This appendix takes up a few of the chief problems encountered during the 
construction of  the capital stock estimates, and describes some of  the tests 
that were run to check the estimating decisions that were made. 
Land Clearing and Breaking 
The largest item in the more unconventional-but  more meaningful-of 
the capital concepts employed in this paper is the value imparted to land by 
the processes of  clearing and first breaking. The estimating procedure was 
simple. The following variables were established for each year: the number of 
acres of improved farmland of each relevant type (land originally under forest, 
land originally under grass) in each state or region; the number of labor hours 
per acre required to improve land of each type; the cost of farm labor in each 
state or region (Primack  1962; Lebergott 1964). Simple multiplication and 
addition produced the final figures. Constant price estimates were obtained by 
substituting technical coefficients and wage rates relevant to  1860 for those 
relevant to the current year. For the years 1840-1900-but  not earlier-esti- 
mates of the value of fencing, drainage, and irrigation works were also made. 
Certain characteristics of the series that may be associated with biased rates 
of change are immediately evident. The weight attributed to the clearing and 
breaking series is incorrect; it is probably too low, especially for the years 
before  1840. Since the clearing and breaking series exhibits relatively low 
rates of change over time, giving it a heavier weight would tend to reduce the 
rates of growth of the aggregate capital stock series, particularly before 1840. 
Thus the acceleration of the rate of change described previously in this paper 
would be enhanced. 100  Robert E. Gallman 
The weight attached to the series is too low because the estimates ignore all 
elements of clearing and breaking cost except labor. Labor was, no doubt, the 
principal cost, but it was not the only one. Second, the only improved land 
treated is agricultural land; no account is taken of land under houses, facto- 
ries, shops, and so forth. Third, for the years before 1840, important elements 
of improvement-particularly  fencing-had  to be ignored. If it had been pos- 
sible to treat all of these phenomena, the improvement series would have had 
a larger weight. 
There are, however, certain offsets. First, the value of  fencing may very 
well have increased faster than the value of clearing, before 1840; it is almost 
certainly true that the volume of  land under houses and so forth increased 
faster than the volume of improved land in  agriculture, at least after 1840. 
Introducing these elements into the analysis might raise the rate of change of 
the improvements series, although probably not by much. 
Another factor may appear, at first blush, to be more important than any so 
far discussed: the estimates make allowance for land retirements (land allowed 
to go back to nature), but not depreciation. The reason depreciation has been 
ignored is that land improvements, if properly maintained, do not depreciate. 
Bad farming practices may erode the fertility of the land, and the opening of 
western farms may reduce the value of eastern farms, but these changes have 
to do mainly with the value of land, rather than with the value of  improve- 
ments. Now in a sense this characteristic  of improvements is shared with other 
elements of the capital stock. Properly maintained, houses and ships and even 
machines can last very long, indeed. The difference is that most of the houses, 
ships, and  machines that existed in, for example, eastern Pennsylvania in 
1774 are gone today, while much of the improved land of  that period is still 
improved. A substantial part of it is now under houses and shopping malls and 
highways, rather than under Indian corn, but it is still improved. Furthermore, 
in the cases of buildings, machines, and so forth, one can devise reasonable 
depreciation rates that properly describe the average lifetime experiences of 
these elements of capital and that are roughly relevant to long reaches of his- 
tory. That is not possible for land improvements. 
The discussion above implicitly introduces another issue. The improve- 
ments series consists of reproduction cost estimates. Various tests have shown 
(see Gallman 1987) that the reproduction cost and the market value of struc- 
tures and manufactured producers’ durables were, on average, about the same 
in the nineteenth century. Is this also true of land improvements? If not, then 
how is the analysis affected? The few simple tests that have been run seem to 
suggest that they are alike. At least two efforts have been made to estimate the 
market value of clearing and breaking at midcentury: one by  Stanley Leber- 
gott for the Midwest, the other by Stanley Engerman and Robert Fogel for the 
South (Lebergott 1985; Fogel and Engerman 1977). Comparisons are not eas- 
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but I do not believe that is the case. The results suggest that estimates com- 
puted along the lines laid out above are very similar to the ones obtained by 
Lebergott and Engerman and Fogel. The suggestion then is that the market 
price and the reproduction cost of  land improvements were about the same, 
on average, at midcentury. 
The same may also hold for 1774. At least it is true that when one subtracts 
from Alice Jones’s estimate of  the value of  real estate, my  estimates of the 
value of land clearing and structures plus a rough allowance for other elements 
of land improvement (a relatively small part of the total), the remaining value, 
divided by  the number of acres of land privately held (derived from Blodget 
[  18061 1964), yields an average price of land per acre-exclusive  of improve- 
ments-that  is almost identical with Blodget’s estimate of the average value 
of  unimproved land in  1774. The test is very roundabout and places much 
weight on a residual. Nonetheless, it encourages one to think that market price 
and reproduction cost may  have been  about the same, on average, at that 
date. 
There is some evidence to the contrary, however.  Specifically, Blodget’s 
estimates of the average value of improved land per acre in  1774, 1799, and 
1805 are substantially smaller than my  estimates of  the cost of  improving 
land per acre. Bear in mind that Blodget’s figures include the value of the land 
itself, while mine do not. The margin is so great that one has the impression 
that if Blodget’s figures are truly market-price figures, and mine truly repro- 
duction cost figures, then farmers of the late eighteenth century and the early 
nineteenth century were behaving irrationally, improving much more land 
than could be justified by the market. I do not believe that and therefore think 
that either Blodget is wrong or I am. 
In making my estimates I assumed that all of the land improved at each of 
these dates had originally been forest land. That is probably not correct, and 
since forest land cost more to improve than grass land, this assumption prob- 
ably leads to an overstatement of the value of cleared land at these dates. But 
the overstatement  is tiny and is surely more than offset by the fact that the cost 
of factors other than labor was left out of account. 
I also assumed that the labor hours per acre required for clearing were the 
same at these early dates as at midcentury. Primack (1962) believed that there 
were no important improvements in clearing techniques until after the Civil 
War, and while his interests were confined to the last half of the century, his 
remark is probably relevant to the early dates treated in this paper as well. In 
any case, if  I am wrong about this matter, I have understated the value of 
improvements at these dates, not overstated them. 
I also assumed that the treatment of  stumps was the same at all dates: spe- 
cifically, that one-third of the stumps were removed immediately and that the 
rest were left in the land to rot away on their own. It may be that an even 
smaller share of the stumps was taken out in the earlier years, but allowing for 102  Robert E. Gallman 
the removal of  no stumps would not bring my  estimates and Blodget’s very 
much closer together.8 
A more promising source of disparity lies in the way in which labor time 
was  valued. I assumed that the opportunity cost of  the labor employed in 
clearing and first breaking could be approximated by  the agricultural wage 
rate. In  fact, however, one would suppose that clearing and  first breaking 
would have been conducted by farmers in the off season, when real opportu- 
nities may have been restricted to maintenance tasks around the farm, hunt- 
ing, fishing, and so forth. The wage rate, then, may overstate the opportunity 
cost of  labor. That seems not to have been the case at midcentury, when, as 
indicated above, reproduction cost and market value of  improvements were 
very similar. It may be that by midcentury clearing and breaking were more 
commonly hired out (e.g., to prairie sodbusters) than  previously and  that 
farmers themselves had better opportunities for off-season work. If that were 
the case, the estimating technique might work better for the mid-nineteenth 
century than for the earlier dates. But that would be a relatively unimportant 
matter. Our concerns are chiefly with the constant price series, which are 
properly a function of the techniques and wage rates of  1860. The contrast 
with Blodget refers exclusively to the current price estimates. 
In  any case, my  by  no  means unbiased guess is that Blodget is simply 
wrong on the matter of the value of  improved land. The check of  my  work 
against Jones’s estimate of the value of real estate and Blodget’s estimate of 
the value of unimproved land seems reasonably strong. Furthermore, in com- 
parison with Jones’s estimate, Blodget’s figures on  the values of  improved 
land seem very much too low.  I therefore incline toward the view that the 
improvements series-particularly  in  constant prices-gives  a reasonable 
view of what it purports to describe. At least I cannot make a case for viewing 
the series as strongly biased in  one direction or the other or as generating 
strongly biased rates of gr~wth.~ 
Structures 
The estimates for 1850-1900  rest chiefly on census data; for 1840 on the 
work of  Seaman (1  852); for 18  15 on the direct tax of  1  8  13-1 5 and the work 
8. The matter of stumps is tricky. What is the reproduction labor cost of ten acres of stumpless 
cleared land that was formerly under trees? Is it the full labor cost of clearing the land and remov- 
ing all the stumps? Or is it the labor cost of  cutting down the trees, removing the one-third of the 
stumps that were originally removed, and plowing the land? I decided that the second choice was 
the correct one, but clearly one could make a case for the first, or perhaps even a third or fourth 
option. 
9. A word should be said about the land series, although there is inadequate space to go through 
the estimating procedures and tests. The 1850-1900  data come from the census, with some ad- 
justments.  The adjustments depend in part on the work of Primack (1962). The 1840 figures are 
weaker. They come from Seaman (1852) again adjusted and distributed, partly on the basis of the 
work of Primack. The figures for 1774 through 1805 are from Blodget ([I8061 1964), adjusted in 
various ways.  The 1815  figure is a rough extrapolation from 1805. For a discussion of  these 
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of  Pitkin (1835); for 1805 on the work of Blodget ([1806] 1964) and Gold- 
smith (1952); for  1799 on the direct tax of  1798 and  the work of  Soltow 
(1984); and for 1774 on the work of Jones (1980). All of these data have been 
very heavily processed, frequently with the object of extracting one element 
from a larger aggregate, or dividing the aggregate among its components. In 
each case but two, however, there is a quite substantial component of real data 
that bears directly on the estimating problem. The weakest links are the ones 
for 1805 and  1840; there are no data expressly relevant to these dates. The 
underlying sources of evidence are the works of  Seaman and Blodget. The 
latter extrapolated his estimate from an earlier date, for which real evidence is 
available, while the former both extrapolated from an earlier date and blew up 
partial estimates to encompass the universe. These figures have been tested, 
of course, but they are less trustworthy than are the rest. 
There is not space to deal with all the estimating problems and with all the 
tests run with respect to the estimates relating to structures. In what follows, 
the most serious problem, which has to do with deflation for the years before 
1850, will be treated. 
For the years 1850-1900  there is no serious problem relating to deflation; 
indeed, the price index number situation is unusually good. For most of these 
years Dorothy Brady’s two sets of deflators-for  houses and churches, on the 
one hand,  and  factories and office buildings, on the other-are  available. 
These are true price indexes, which makes them quite unusual among con- 
struction deflators. Usually it is necessary to make do with cost indexes. Bra- 
dy’s data need modest adjustment to make them expressly apposite to the task 
of deflating the capital stock, but no heroic efforts are needed to put them in 
proper condition for this purpose. 
The problem appears in the years before 1850, for which Brady’s indexes 
are not available. One possibility for this period is to follow the lead of David 
and Solar (1977), who linked Brady’s housing price index to a construction 
cost index and then carried it back to the late eighteenth century. Since the 
relative importance of  factories and  office  buildings before the  1840s was 
probably slight and since construction techniques in this period may not have 
varied much between residential construction and commercial buildings (ex- 
cept at the cutting edge of factory design and construction), an extension of 
the housing price index would be an entirely adequate way to deal with the 
deflation problem for all kinds of structures. David and Solar, however, did 
not use Brady’s published series; they used the unrevised figures that Brady 
prepared for the Income and Wealth Conference. It turns out that in  most 
instances the differences between the published and unpublished series are 
slight-matters  of  a point or two. There is one exception. In the published 
conference volume, Brady (1966) dropped her estimate of the price index of 
housing in 1839. 
The Brady unpublished index falls from a level of  128 in 1839, to 94 in 
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much more modestly and rise more sharply over these two decades, implying 
that, if  the unpublished Brady index is correct, productivity in construction 
must have been rising quite dramatically. David  and Solar believe that the 
experience reflects chiefly the diffusion of  the balloon frame, which was in- 
vented in  1833. They therefore suppose that the annual rate of  productivity 
improvement realized in the 1840s was also achieved in the period 1834-39. 
They construct a building cost index and employ it with the Brady price index 
to estimate productivity gains,  1839-59,  and they then use it, together with 
their estimate of the rate of productivity improvement, 1839-49,  to extrapo- 
late the Brady price index number for 1839 back to 1834. They assume that 
there were no important productivity improvements before 1833 and extrapo- 
late the 1834 price index number to earlier years in the century on their con- 
struction  cost  index.  The  productivity improvement  for  the  period  1834 
through 1859 implied by their calculations is a little more than 36 percent. 
The procedure is ingenious and surely adequate to the purposes of  David 
and Solar. It is not so clear that it is adequate to the purpose of  creating a 
deflator for the most important component of the conventional capital stock 
series. First there is the matter of Brady’s decision to suppress her 1839 esti- 
mate. Does this mean that she had had second thoughts about the strength of 
that estimate? Presumably. Nonetheless there remains evidence that Brady be- 
lieved that construction prices did fall in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Her 
price index for factories drops very sharply between 1836 and 1844, for ex- 
ample. But of course this index refers to factories, not residences.’O 
Is it reasonable to suppose that the balloon frame led to a rise in productiv- 
ity of  36 percent in the first twenty-five years of its existence? Probably not. 
The balloon frame saved on framing. Framing accounted for about 25 percent 
of  the cost of  a building. Consequently, even if the balloon frame eliminated 
the expense of framing and even if the balloon frame was adopted throughout 
the industry within this period, the rise in productivity could not have come 
close to reaching 36 percent. Neither condition was met, of course.” 
10. One should not infer much about productivity changes from the relative movements of price 
and cost indexes between  1836 and 1844, however. Between these two dates lay a very sharp 
contraction. At least part of the decline in prices reflected falling profits, not rising productivity. It 
is also likely that workers discounted standard wage rates in order to hold their jobs. 
11. For example, “although many authorities assert that balloon frame construction had ‘almost 
completely replaced the hewn frame for domestic construction by the time of the Civil War’ . . . 
in North Carolina field surveys demonstrate the prevalence of heavy mortised-and-tenoned house 
frames until the Civil War” (Bishir, Brown, Lounsbury, and Wood 1990,457). An architect whose 
book  was published in 1855 writes: “There is no doubt that if the subject received closer attention, 
a better mode of framing than that generally employed, could be  suggested. Timbers are often 
unnecessarily heavy, but are afterwards so weakened by the mode of framing which is in vogue, 
and which compels the cutting of mortices and tenons and insertion of  one timber into another, 
that the frame is less substantial than if constructed of lighter stuff differently put together. It is 
difficult to persuade carpenters of this” (Wheeler 1855,407). The implication of the last statement 
is important. The building industry was a conservative, locally organized industry. The architect 
goes on: “The New  York  Tribune of  January  18th.  1855, reported a meeting of the American 
Institute Farmers’ Club, and contained amongst other items some remarks from one of the mem- 105  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
The framing of a building called for many  workers. Barn-raising parties 
were  organized expressly for this  purpose. The balloon  frame eventually 
changed all that. With the new system a man and a boy could frame a house 
by themselves. Thus the innovation became immensely important to the farm- 
ing community, particularly for people on the frontier, for reasons that tran- 
scended normal cost considerations. It also diffused quickly in new western 
cities, places under intense demand pressure and without established artisanal 
power groups. (Chicago and San Francisco were both balloon frame cities.) 
But it did not immediately spread to the East. 
There were, of course, other innovations during this period, so that the rise 
in productivity that David and Solar identify need not be the result exclusively 
of  the balloon frame. The principal changes that seem to have been taking 
place involved the transfer of some activities from the building site to mills. 
For example, it is said that it became more common to use manufactured 
nails, as well as manufactured windows and doors, which presumably low- 
ered costs. But the census returns of  1810, 1850, and 1860 suggest that man- 
ufactured nails were already widely used before the 1830s. Mill-made sash, 
doors, and blinds do not appear in the census returns-separately,  at least- 
before 1860, when their output amounted to a value of about $9.5 million, in 
a year in which the total value of conventional construction (exclusive of rail- 
roads and canals) ran to about $345 million. Mill-made windows and so forth 
were therefore by no means negligible by this date, but they did not bulk large 
enough to suggest that their introduction led to a major improvement in pro- 
ductivity. Furthermore, it may well be that their contribution to productivity 
actually came after 1849, rather than before. At least the treatment of  these 
lines of production by the census suggests that this was so. David and Solar 
find most of the productivity change (almost three-quarters of  it) occurring 
before 1849. 
The general idea lying behind the David and Solar treatment of construction 
prices is clearly reasonable, and their execution of  it may have solved their 
problem satisfactorily. The technique is less likely to solve my  problem satis- 
factorily, however. Unfortunately, there is no option that is clearly superior. 
bers upon a novel mode of constructing cheap wooden dwellings” (408). The “novel method” was 
the balloon frame. 
The extent to which innovations had diffused is relevant because it would have determined the 
degree to which prices responded to innovations. Prices would have been potentially affected only 
in localities in which the new framing system had begun to diffuse, and even there, prices need 
not have fallen immediately, if competition among builders was not severe. If builders commonly 
used cost plus pricing, of course, prices would have fallen immediately in areas where the balloon 
frame was put in use. 
There is a question as to whether Brady’s prices refer to average practice or best practice. I have 
assumed they refer to  average practice.  If I am not correct in this assumption,  and if  builders 
followed cost plus pricing  practices,  then the Brady price  index numbers exaggerate the true 
decline in average prices. The course of average relative prices of residences after 1849 suggests 
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Nonetheless, I decided to accept the Brady indexes for the years 1849 onward. 
I then adjusted them to fit  my  needs, and  extrapolated the adjusted 1849 
(1850) index number to  1840, 1815, 1805, 1799, and  1785 on the Adams 
(1975) variant B (allowing for input substitutions) construction cost series. 
The index was extended to 1774 on a construction cost series based on the 
David and Solar common wage index, a Maryland farm wage rate, taken from 
Adams (1986, 629-30),  and the Bezanson-Gray-Hussey arithmetic average 
price index for Philadelphia (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, ser. E-1 1  1). 
The last two steps need further discussion. 
The Adams construction cost index was exceptionally carefully made from 
good basic data. It is an excellent construction cost index, and the version 
used allows for factor substitutions due to shifts in relative input prices. For 
present purposes, however, it has certain potential shortcomings. The ideal 
index, for present purposes, is a true price index, an index that allows for 
changes in productivity. The Adams index does not do that, except insofar as 
productivity changes are associated with shifts in factor proportions. As proxy 
for a true price index it will exaggerate any long-term price increases and 
understate any long-term price decreases, so long as productivity improve- 
ments are taking place. The capital stock series that it is used to deflate will 
then exhibit a rate of  change that is biased in a downward direction. In the 
present instance, the bias would exaggerate the observed acceleration in the 
rate of growth of the capital stock. If the bias were serious enough, it would 
account fully for the acceleration. That seems highly unlikely, however. The 
sources of  productivity improvement in construction do not appear to have 
been important before the mid-l830s, and, as I have tried to show, even in the 
period between the mid-1830s and the beginning of the true price indexes in 
1849, the amount of productivity improvement is unlikely to have been very 
great. In any case, the Adams index has other shortcomings for present pur- 
poses, and it turns out that at least one of these may introduce a compensating 
bias, in direction at least, and perhaps in amount as well. 
The Adams index refers exclusively to Philadelphia. How successfully does 
it represent the United States? Two questions immediately arise. First, hous- 
ing price levels varied by region, and as time passed, the relative importance 
of  the various regions changed. Did the shifts in regional weights affect the 
trend in the national average of housing prices? Probably not, and if they did, 
they tended to raise average prices a little. By ignoring the effects of the re- 
gional shift I can perhaps compensate slightly for whatever bias is, present 
from the use of a cost index in place of a true price index. These conclusions 
are based on the results of a test of the following form. 
The census of  1840 requested information on the numbers of two types of 
houses constructed in the census year, those built of brick and stone and those 
built of wood, as well as the value of both types of houses taken together. I 
used the state data in a regression analysis to obtain an intercept value and 
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ployed to value the houses constructed in each state, and the figures thus ob- 
tained were divided through the census returns of the value of houses built to 
get an index number for each state. The index number compares the value of 
the houses constructed in the state with the value that would have obtained if 
prices had been at the level of the national average. Clearly, the index numbers 
reflect not only variations in building prices-which  are required for the pro- 
posed  analysis-but  also  differences in  average  size and  quality of  new 
houses, from state to state. Since cost, size, and quality were likely to have 
varied together-frontier  areas having lower building costs, smaller houses, 
and houses of lower quality than the well-settled areas-the  index numbers 
almost certainly exaggerate the regional variations in building costs, a point 
to be borne in mind as the analysis unfolds. 
The individual state index numbers were then used to deflate the state re- 
turns of the value of  real estate in  1799, according to the direct tax. The sum 
of the deflated returns was then divided through the aggregate current price 
value of real estate in  1799, according to the direct tax. The result was an 
index number of  0.932,  which compares with  the  1840 index number of 
1 .OOO; that is, according to these calculations, the shifting weights among 
states tended to raise, very slightly, the true price index of structures between 
1799 and  1840.12 The index numbers almost certainly overstate the true im- 
pact of the redistribution of the value of structures among states in this period, 
because the state index numbers probably overstate (for reasons previously 
given) the true variation in building costs among states. It appears unneces- 
sary, then, to adjust the Adams cost index to take into account the effects 
of  the shifting real-value-of-structures  weights among states. This is particu- 
larly the case in view of the fact that the Adams index is a cost index and is 
likely, therefore, to exaggerate the extent to which the prices of buildings rose 
or to understate the extent to which they fell during this period. Finally, if the 
bias is slight between 1799 and 1840, it is almost certainly negligible between 
1774 and 1799. 
There is another aspect of the regional specificity of the Adams index that 
must  be  considered. Do  changes in  Philadelphia costs properly represent 
changes in costs in other regions? The strong suggestion that one gets from 
looking at price and wage indexes from New England and New York (Roth- 
enberg 1988; David and Solar 1977; Warren and Pearson 1933) is that they do 
not: Adams’s cost index moves in step with the Bezanson-Gray-Hussey gen- 
eral price index (Philadelphia-U.S.  Bureau of the Census 1975, ser. E-97), 
while the Rothenberg, David-Solar, and Warren-Pearson indexes also move 
more or less together, but quite differently from the Philadelphia indexes. (At 
least these statements apply to the benchmark dates relevant here.) David and 
12. The two indexes should ideally be weighted by  the state distribution of the real value of 
houses in the capital stock. These, in fact, are the weights utilized for 1799, but the weights for 
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Solar report that  a construction cost index they assembled from materials 
prices from New York  (Warren and Pearson 1933) and common wage rates 
from Philadelphia (Adams 1975) and the Erie Canal (Smith 1963) exhibits a 
less pronounced decline between 1809 and 1834 than does the Adams index. 
I constructed an index from Warren and Pearson materials prices and David- 
Solar common wages (using Adams’s weights and his procedure for allowing 
for factor substitutions) for all the relevant dates. The Adams index shows a 
much more pronounced drop over time than does the WP-DS index. There is 
the strong suggestion that a properly derived national construction cost index 
would exhibit more pronounced price increases and less pronounced price 
declines, over the long run, than would a Philadelphia index. The bias im- 
parted to the real capital stock series from using a cost index to proxy a price 
index is, then, compensated for-in  part? in whole? more than compensated 
for?-by  the fact that Philadelphia prices moved differently from national av- 
erage prices, at least after 1799, and probably from 1774 as well. 
There is one final problem with the deflator: it represents the costs of com- 
mercial construction in a city. A substantial fraction of the stock of structures 
in the years 1799 through 1840 must have been built in the countryside by 
unprofessional labor. The matter may  not be very important, however.  Ac- 
cording to Adams, Philadelphia construction and Maryland farm wage rates 
moved in roughly similar ways among the dates 1785, 1799, 1805,18  15, and 
1840. 
One cannot claim great accuracy for the deflator, but on the whole it seems 
satisfactory. 
Animal Inventories 
There are at least two problems with the animal inventory estimates. First, 
they include only farm animals from 1840 onward (animals used in the mines 
are part of the “equipment” estimates in mining) and probably only farm ani- 
mals at earlier dates as well, whereas ideally one would like to have all do- 
mestic animals throughout. The omissions are not trivial, but neither are they 
of overwhelming importance. In 1860, just over 12 percent of domestic ani- 
mals, by  value, were located off  farms (U.S.  Bureau of  the Census 1860, 
cviii, cxxvi, 192); in 1900, the fraction was just under 7 percent (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census 1900, cxliv). The suggestion is that the total stock of animals 
increased a little more slowly than did the stock of farm animals, but correct- 
ing for this shortcoming would probably not affect very substantially the con- 
clusions previously reached. 
The second problem has to do with deflation. The constant price series was 
made by applying base-year prices (1860) to estimates of the numbers of ani- 
mals in each year. The assumption is that a pig is a pig. In fact, pigs in 1890 
were, without much doubt, superior animals to pigs of  1830. The deflator, 
then, is biased, and deflation tends to understate the importance of the growth 
of the stock of animals. Furthermore, the effect is also likely to be to under- 109  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
play the acceleration in the rate of growth of the per capita capital stock. The 
reason is that most of the gains in the quality of  animals were realized after 
midcentury. In earlier decades there were probably periods when, on balance, 
the quality of animal stocks actually deteriorated. Nonetheless, numbers can 
reasonably proxy real values before 1840 or 1850, whereas they are less able 
to perform this function thereafter. There are, of  course, problems with the 
evidence on numbers as well, but they seem less pressing and do not deserve 
a place in this brief treatment of the subject. On the whole, the series, despite 
these qualifications, is acceptable for the uses to which it has been put. 
Other Inventories 
The procedure followed is one employed by Kuznets (1946, 228). Inven- 
tories were taken as a fixed fraction of the value of imports and the value of 
outputs of the agricultural, manufacturing, and mining sectors. No allowance 
was made for changes in the efficiency with which inventories were used, a 
matter of limited importance, especially before the Civil War.  If  there were 
improvements in efficiency, then the estimating procedure tends to exaggerate 
the acceleration in the rate of change of the real per capita capital stock. The 
details of how the value of imports and outputs were obtained are best left to 
another occasion. 
Equipment 
The data for the years 1840 onward were derived chiefly from the census, 
were deflated by Dorothy Brady’s true price indexes, and were tested-with 
considerable success-against  perpetual inventory estimates (Gallman 1987). 
For the earlier years, the chief sources were Jones (1980), Blodget ([1806] 
1964), Goldsmith (1952), and U.S.  Bureau of the Census (1975, for Treasury 
data on shipping). The series seems adequate for present purposes, but should 
not be trusted for much more. 
Conclusions 
It should be obvious that a substantial margin for error must be allowed for 
all of the estimates discussed in this paper, especially those dated before 1850, 
and particularly for those at the turn of  the century. On the other hand, it is 
not obvious that the rates of change computed from the series are subject to 
important biases. The conclusions reached in sections 2.3-2.5  need not be 
altered-at  least not on the basis of the results of the review conducted in this 
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Appendix B 
Time-Quality  Adjustments to the 
Labor Force Estimates 
This appendix describes the time-quality adjustments that were made to the 
labor  force  estimates,  for  purposes  of  the  measurement and  analysis of 
changes in total factor inputs and changes in total factor productivity (table 
2.10). The last paragraph takes up the estimation of the elasticities of output 
with respect to factor inputs that are necessary to make estimates of total fac- 
tor productivity changes. 
The estimates were made in two steps. First, the farm labor force figures 
were adjusted to take into account changes in the farm work year.I3 Then 
quality-time weights were devised for the two remaining sectors that could be 
readily distinguished: mining, manufacturing, and hand trades, and all others. 
The weights consisted of the ratio of labor income per worker in the relevant 
sector to labor income per worker in agriculture. Since two of the important 
factors accounting for sectoral differences in labor income per worker are the 
relative duration of  the labor year in each sector and the relative quality of 
workers in each sector, one is perhaps justified in refemng to these ratios as 
time-quality weights. Unfortunately, however, other factors-factors  irrele- 
vant to the time-quality adjustment-also  affect intersectoral differences in 
labor income per worker. Sectoral labor income deviations arose out of short- 
term disequilibria in labor markets, as well as from enduring quality differ- 
ences among workers. Furthermore, some part of the variations in labor in- 
come surely reflected regional and urban-rural price differences, rather than 
real income disparities. It is likely that both of these factors typically operated 
to widen the gaps between labor incomes in  agriculture and the other two 
sectors identified, each of  which enjoyed higher labor incomes per worker 
than did the agricultural sector. Since the labor forces attached to these two 
sectors were growing faster than the agricultural labor force, the excessive 
time-quality weights given these sectors mean that the rates of change of the 
time-quality adjusted labor series are biased upward. The present status of 
regional and urban-rural price series does not permit an appropriate deflating 
of the labor income series, and there is no way of knowing how serious the 
bias arising out of disequilibria in labor markets is. 
There are other difficulties with these measurements. 
1. It would be helpful to have detailed breakdowns of the labor force and 
labor earnings, so that a more fully articulated weighting scheme might be 
developed, but adequate data simply are not available. 
2. Sectoral labor income estimates were developed from value-added data. 
Value-added estimates involve some double-counting  . If the extent of double- 
counting varied from one sector to another, the labor income estimates would 
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not be good indexes of the true relative sectoral labor incomes. It is quite 
unlikely, however, that this problem is, in fact, at all serious. 
3. The labor income estimates were taken as residuals, the difference be- 
tween total sectoral income and sectoral property income. Property income 
was estimated as the product of the value of  capital and land and estimated 
rates of  return.  Since the estimates of  inventories could not be distributed 
among sectors, property income was computed against the value of land and 
fixed capital only. If  the relative importance of inventories varied by  sector, 
the sectoral property estimates are biased. Unfortunately, there is no way to 
be sure that this was not the case, although it is unlikely that we have here a 
major source of bias. 
4. More important, the system of estimating property incomes involved the 
assumption that the rate of return on property ofa  given rype was the same in 
all sectors. In fact, this is unlikely to have been the case. The work of Bate- 
man and Weiss shows that the returns to property in the antebellum South 
were  much higher  in  manufacturing than in  agriculture (1981,  107,  108, 
1  14).l4  Unfortunately, there is no good basis for producing different sectoral 
rates of return for all types of property for all sectors in all years. We  can be 
quite sure, however, that the procedure followed to produce labor income es- 
timates has led to an exaggeration of the relative levels of labor income in the 
“mining, manufacturing, and hand trades” sector, and probably in  the “all 
other” sector as well. This in  turn means that the time-quality weights at- 
tached to the nonfarm sector labor forces are too high and that, therefore, the 
rates of change of the adjusted labor series are biased upward. 
The sectoral value-added series (current prices) were taken from volumes 
24 and 34 of  Studies in Income and Wealth (Gallman 1960, 47, 54, 56, 63; 
Gallman and Weiss 1969, 305), and were adjusted in the following ways. The 
estimates of farmland improvements were dropped from farm value-added, 
and new estimates, derived from data in volume 30 of Studies in Income and 
Wealth (Brady 1966) were substituted for them.I5 Value  added by  the “all 
14. The rates of return I have used do vary from one sector to another, as the structure of the 
capital stock varies; only the rates for individual types of property are constant. But the differences 
in the average rates that have emerged are small, compared with the ones observed by Bateman 
and Weiss. For example, the average rates I have obtained in four of the years are 
1840  1860  1880  1900 
Agriculture  1 1.6%  11  .O%  9.4%  7.6% 
All other  13.2  12.5  10.7  8.9 
Bateman and Weiss (1981, 116) report rates of return for large manufacturing firms of  17% in 
1850, and 21% in 1860. 
15. Gallman 1966, 35, variant I. The estimates are available in constant prices only. Current 
price estimates were made by assuming that the ratio of improvements to farm value added was 
the same in current and constant prices.  The average value of improvements for 1834-43  was 
taken to correspond to the value of  improvements in census year 1839, and so forth. The ratio of 
the value of improvements to the value of farm value added in 1859 was estimated on the basis of 
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other” sector was formed by  adding to total value added by services (taken 
from volume 34 of Studies in Income and Wealth), value added by construc- 
tion (drawn from volume 24 of  Studies in Income and Wealth, construction 
variant A), and then subtracting the value of  shelter and value added by  the 
hand trades. The value of shelter was dropped because the production of  shel- 
ter involves the use of practically no labor and therefore the value of shelter 
should not figure in the estimation of  sectoral labor quality weights. Value 
added by the hand trades was added to value added by  manufacturing and 
mining, taken from volume 24. 
The gross rate of  return for each type of  property is composed of the net 
rate plus depreciation (if  any).  The following depreciation rates were as- 
sumed: Land, 0; animals, 0; buildings, fences, irrigation, and drainage works, 
2 percent; land clearing and breaking, 0; tools and equipment, 6.67 percent. 
The net rate of return was taken to be  10 percent in 1860 and was adjusted in 
the other years on the basis of an index number of the rate of return on New 
England municipal bonds (Homer 1963, 287-288,  linked at 1857-59  to Bos- 
ton City 5s, 305). 
The labor force data were drawn from Weiss’s paper in this volume. The 
division of  the nonfarm labor force between the two nonfarm sectors was 
based on Lebergott (  1964). 
The adjustment for changes in agricultural work hours was based on data in 
Gallman (1975, 73), and the David, Lebergott, and Weiss series. From Gall- 
man  (1975, 73, inclusive of  improvements, variant B),  and the David and 
Lebergott farm labor force series, it was possible to compute an index of the 
hours worked by farm laborers in 1800, 1850, and 1900. With this index and 
the Weiss farm labor force in each of these three years, an index of the number 
of  hours worked per worker was computed. Index numbers for the missing 
intermediate years were interpolated on a straight line. The index for 1774 
was assumed to be the same as the index for 1800. The aggregate quality- 
adjusted labor force series were then adjusted for changes in the number of 
hours worked by multiplying them by the index of hours worked per worker. 
The procedure adopted to make estimates of the elasticities of output with 
respect to inputs was similar to the one by which labor and property incomes 
were computed for the three sectors (see above). The only difference was that 
the calculations were made at the national, not the sectoral, level and that 
components of  capital left out of the sectoral calculations-inventories,  the 
international sector-were  here added back in. 
the ratio of  improvements,  1849-58,  and farm value added 1854. A similar procedure was fol- 
lowed to obtain the ratio for census year 1869. 113  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
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Comment  Stanley L. Engerman 
Robert Gallman here uses measures of  the capital stock to estimate and de- 
scribe the pattern of economic growth in the United States from the Revolu- 
tionary period to the end of the nineteenth century. The measures represent a 
continuation of his ongoing work, previously published in several places.’ In 
these earlier publications he has presented many of the details of calculation 
for the 1840 to 1900 estimates, as well as described the various concepts and 
tests going into their preparation. In general, most of these problems are well- 
known and ably discussed, so there can be little new to say here in regard to 
the major issues. Following another remark of Giffen’s, we can only compli- 
ment Gallman for doing the best that can be done with the limited data avail- 
able, and though the “figures are necessarily rough,” they make “a little clear 
what would otherwise be most dark, and they suggest problems for inquiry 
which would not otherwise be  thought of.”  For “the figures, though rough, 
can be reasoned on safely with care.”2 
There is one initial point about the basic concept of  capital that Gallman 
uses that is worth noting. His measures are restricted to variants of physical 
capital. There are no estimates of human capital, even of the slave population 
for which market values do exist. But, compared to the familiar constructs of 
Goldsmith, Gallman’s measure is not of all tangible wealth, since he does not 
Stanley L. Engerman is John H. Munro Professor of Economics and professor of history at the 
University of Rochester and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
1. Robert E. Gallman, “The United States capital stock in the nineteenth century,” in Long-term 
factors in American economic growth, ed. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, NBER 
Studies in Income and Wealth, 51 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 165-206;  and 
“Investment flows and capital stocks: U.S. experience in the nineteenth century,” in Quantity and 
quiddity: Essays in  U.S. economic history  in  honor of  Stanley L. Lebergott, ed. Peter Kilby 
(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 214-54. 
2. Robert Giffen, Growth ofcapital (London: George Bell and Sons, 1889), 157. 116  Robert E. Gallman 
include all of the value of land, nor is it all reproducible tangible wealth, since 
he does include some of the value of  land.3 Rather, Gallman’s estimates in- 
clude the value of improvements made to land, approximately equal in some 
years, it turns out, to the market value of improved land. Although Gallman’s 
measure does omit the value of  privately owned unimproved land and the 
“pure rent” on the acres improved, in most years the value of  improved land 
represents the largest part of the total value of land. Thus the distinction be- 
tween the Goldsmith and the Gallman treatments of  land, while interesting 
and important, will not seriously distort most long-term comparisons. 
Gallman uses the capital stock both as a means of  measuring economic 
growth, for a period of time for which the basis of income measurement is not 
readily available, and as part of  the explanation of  the nature of  economic 
growth, using capital stock measures with related input data to describe the 
patterns of change. There are some points to consider in the use of changes in 
the capital stock to measure changes in income level, as well as some differ- 
ences between measures of potential income (which is perhaps the most de- 
sired measure of economic growth), observed (measured) income, and capi- 
tal. There are choices made out of  potential income that influence observed 
income and the observed capital stock. The choices between goods and lei- 
sure, and decisions in regard to fertility, clearly influence measured output per 
capita, as do the effects of  intensity avoidance, risk avoidance, and market 
avoidance upon the product mix and thus potential income forgone. Capital, 
being based upon the amounts of income not consumed in the past, will have 
a different growth rate than income if  there are changes in the savings rate 
over time. In addition, in considering the effects of savings upon the capital 
stock and its measured potential for future growth, it is also necessary to con- 
sider the form that these savings and investments take, and the related differ- 
ences in types of assets and in their longevity. Savings can be used to provide 
either producer durables or consumer durables (the latter are omitted by Gall- 
man, except for dwellings). It has, for example, been argued that in English 
history the level of savings was long sufficient to have financed the industrial 
revolution, but that a change in its structure and composition was needed for 
long-term gr~wth.~  Further, as Gallman points out, the longevity of  capital 
will influence the breakdown between gross and net investment, and of  the 
available capital stock. Estimates of asset durability and obsolescence are not, 
as Gallman notes, independent of the performance of the economy and its rate 
3. See,  for example, Raymond W.  Goldsmith, “The growth of  the reproducible wealth of the 
United States of America,  1805 to  1905,” in Income and wealth of the United States: Trends and 
structure,  ed. Simon Kuznets,  Income and Wealth Series, 2 (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 
1952), 247-328;  and The national balance sheer of  the United States, 1953-1980 (Chicago: Uni- 
versity of Chicago Press, 1982). 
4. M. M. Postan, “Recent trends in the accumulation of  capital,” Economic History Review 6 
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of technical change. Kuznets suggests that one of  the basic shifts from the 
premodern to the modem era was not in the gross investment rate, but rather 
reflected  an increase in asset longevity, lowering capital consumption, and 
leading to a larger capital stock from the gross in~estment.~ 
How good a proxy for the rate of growth of income is the rate of growth of 
the capital stock? In the long-run, increases in both are part of modem eco- 
nomic growth, and high growth (relative to preindustrial times) of  both will 
come together. In the United States, the capital stock generally grew more 
rapidly than did GNP throughout the nineteenth century (and, depending on 
which of  the several variants used from table 2.4, possibly after 1774), ac- 
counting for the rising capital-output ratio over that period. For shorter inter- 
vals, however, there are also differences not only in magnitudes, but even in 
the comparative ranking of rates of change, and the periods of acceleration or 
deceleration can differ. Thus the choice between income and capital as a mea- 
sure of growth can influence examinations of the turning points in the growth 
process. Nevertheless, since for the period before 1840 it seems more possible 
to build up capital estimates from probate inventories and tax reports than to 
generate income data when no census production (or labor force) data are 
available, clearly these capital stock estimates for the early period must pro- 
vide an essential set of measurements to be used by economic historians in the 
quantitative study of economic growth. 
Gallman’s estimates indicate that the post- 1840 years of the nineteenth cen- 
tury had rates of growth of the capital stock per capita more rapid than those 
in preceding years.6 In particular, the 1840 to 1860 growth rate exceeded that 
of the pre-1840 years and, indeed, almost all twenty-year periods since. This 
is not the same as dating the acceleration of  growth in 1840, since the most 
analyzed data are for 1774, 1805, and 1840 (with 1815 given less attention). 
Thus it is hard to pinpoint from the data exactly when after 1805 (or 18 15) the 
growth spurt began,  but  clearly some increase in capital’s growth rate oc- 
curred in the first half of the nineteenth century (for at least three of the four 
series shown in table 2.6). For the last quarter of the eighteenth century the 
capital stock probably also grew at higher rates than did income, particularly 
for the concept of  capital that  excludes land clearing. Note,  also, that  the 
1774-1840  rate of increase of the U.S. capital stock was considerably above 
that for Great Britain in this period.’ 
5. Simon Kuznets, “Capital formation in modem economic growth (and some implications for 
the past),” in Third International Conference of  Economic History (Paris: Mouton, 1968). 
6. In general, unless otherwise stated, the comparisons will be based on the Gallman capital 
stock series including land clearing and breaking, with the consumer price index as a deflator. 
While most comparisons would not differ if any of the other series were used, some would require 
minor alteration. 
7. C. H. Feinstein,  “Capital formation in Great Britain,” in The Cambridge economic history 
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The growth pattern of the U.S. capital stock was consistent with the general 
pattern of  growth in  income, which also had  an acceleration in the interval 
between 1800 and 1840. Compared to Thomas Weiss’s (chap.  1 in this vol- 
ume) newest estimates of  national income, and  using the estimated capital 
stock including land clearing, capital grew at a more rapid rate than did in- 
come between 1800 and  1840, while both had  considerably higher rates of 
growth after 1840 than before, with the shift upward in the growth of  capital 
being sharper than that in income. Weiss has some acceleration in the growth 
of per capita income after 1820, consistent with Gallman’s post-1815 accel- 
eration in capital stock growth.8 
Significant structural shifts in the composition of the capital stock occurred, 
particularly when looking at the measure of capital stock including the value 
of land improvements. The relative shares of the other four major components 
of capital changed relatively little prior to 1840, particularly in constant dollar 
measures. The share of land improvements declined sharply starting with the 
1774 estimates, while a quite dramatic decline in the share of animal invento- 
ries began in  1840. (There was possibly a smaller reduction in the food ob- 
tained from these inventories.) Both declines reflect the relative reduction in 
the role of the agricultural sector in the economy. There was a sharp rise in the 
share of equipment in constant dollar estimates (influenced by the fall in the 
relative price of  equipment compared to construction), which starts around 
1840 and accelerates after 1870. 
As noted, one cause of the shift in the structure of capital was the decline 
in the share of the agricultural sector in the nineteenth century, a decline that 
in the Weiss labor force estimates was particularly sharp in the period from 
1840 to 1860. There was a considerably greater decline in the capital share in 
agriculture than in Weiss’s labor force estimates for 1800 to 1860, and overall 
a larger, but smoother, decline after 1840 than that in the Lebergott labor force 
series. And, if  we use equipment as a rough measure of modernization, the 
fact that in 1840 it accounted for only 6 or 8 percent of  the constant dollar 
capital stock suggests that up to that time increased investment in this com- 
ponent had only a limited potential for influencing the overall measured rate 
of growth of the economy, a point also indicated by the estimates of the share 
of the labor force in manufacturing. 
It will be useful to place some of  the issues raised by  Gallman’s capital 
stock estimates in a broader international and intertemporal perspective, par- 
ticularly in comparisons with the other major developing economy of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Great Britain. 
First, the United States had high growth rates in total and per capita capital 
stock from quite early years, rates of  growth not  achieved by  many other 
countries until the period after World War 11,  a finding rather similar to that 
8. Note that Margo (chap. 4 in this volume), whose series for real wages begins in 1820, finds 
a shift upward in real wages in the 1830s or (in his preferred series) the 1840s. 119  American Economic Growth before the Civil War 
for the growth of  in~ome.~  Indeed, U.S. capital stock, total and per capita, 
grew much more rapidly than did that for the “first industrial nation,” Great 
Britain, between the late eighteenth century and the end of the nineteenth. 
Second, the high U.S. capital stock growth was accomplished with, before 
1840, a savings ratio rather low by later standards.’O The U.S. ratio of savings 
to income was probably lower than that of  the British in the years between 
1760 and 1840, the British ratio rising somewhat earlier (between 1760 and 
1800) than that of the United States. After 1840 the U.S. ratio rises, sharply 
after the Civil War, and remains high through the remainder of the nineteenth 
century, Unlike the United States savings ratio the British ratio remained ba- 
sically unchanged throughout the nineteenth century. The United States had, 
by the late nineteenth century, the highest savings rate among developed coun- 
tries, rates not reached by many countries until after World War 11. 
Third, while the United States had a slightly higher share of  land in total 
tangible wealth at the start of the nineteenth century than did Great Britain, in 
subsequent years of the nineteenth century both countries had roughly similar 
declines in the land share, although there was significant decade-to-decade 
variability. What might seem noteworthy, given the major differences in geo- 
graphic expanse, industrial structure, and so forth, is the relative smallness of 
the intercountry differences in the shares of land in total wealth. 
Fourth, the United States had a considerably lower capital-output ratio than 
did Great Britain (and the rest of the world) in the nineteenth century. Of the 
twenty countries for which Goldsmith provides data on capital-output ratios 
for net tangible assets, no country before 1939 had a capital-output ratio as 
low as that of the United States in 1850, with the exception of  India.” The 
United States had, at the onset of growth, probably the lowest average ratio of 
capital to  output of  all  developing countries; the British ratio of  tangible 
wealth to income in  1800 was several times that of  the United States. Post- 
1840, however, there were sharp rises in the United States in both the rate of 
savings out of current income and the ratio of capital to output. By the end of 
the century the U.S. capital-output ratio was among the lower, but was by no 
means the lowest, among developed countries. For the British, the capital- 
output ratio fell sharply throughout the century. The relative differences in the 
movement of output growth per unit of capital growth pose some interesting 
comparative questions for studies of the sources of growth. 
Gallman’s basic findings regarding the growth of the capital stock and its 
acceleration in the first part of the nineteenth century present a pattern similar 
to that of the growth of  income, and all of  this seems quite plausible given 
9. See Raymond W. Goldsmith, Comparative national balance sheets: A study of twenty coun- 
rries, 1688-1978 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
10. See Lance E. Davis and Robert E. Gallman, “Capital formation in the United States during 
the nineteenth century,” in The Cambridge economic history of  Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), vol. 7,  pt. 2. Gallman, “United States capital stock.” 
1 1. Goldsmith, Comparative national balance sheets. 120  Robert E. Gallman 
other sources and the present state of  knowledge. Thus the consistency is 
somewhat reassuring. 
These capital stock estimates for the early national period pose many famil- 
iar historical questions, which Gallman has discussed here and elsewhere.  I* 
How were they financed? What individual behavior led to this new level of 
savings and investment? Did this require the formation of new institutions  and 
legal provisions? And, given the role of land clearing and its importance, how 
much did it cost in terms of forgone output or was it, for the most part, for- 
gone leisure? And, if  the latter, was this increase in investment in improve- 
ments undertaken due to a taste change in favor of goods or was it due to a 
shift in the opportunity cost of time? Thus, as Gallman suggests, what seem 
for some purposes to be interesting questions for measurement are also signif- 
icant issues for the broad understanding of the historical process. 
12. As have Davis and Gallman in “Capital formation in the United States.” 